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POLITICS AND TRIBALISM IN THE KATANGA

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THE FOURTEEN MILLION inhabitants of the former Belgian Congo are divided into an estimated 183 culturally distinct tribes and sub-tribes including Pygmies, Nilotics, Sudanese, and Bantu.¹ The 144 Bantu-speaking tribes contain most of the population and inhabit at least two-thirds of the land area. Despite this diversity, the languages and cultures of the Congo are relatively homogeneous, and extend north and south of the political boundaries to include the entire Congo Basin.²

The Katanga is second only to Orientale in size among the six Congo provinces, and is infinitely the richest, providing 65 per cent of all Congo exports. The huge mining company of *Union Minière du Haut-Katanga* alone paid one-third of the nation's budget, which in 1954 was 160 million dollars.³ This helps explain why nearly a third of all the non-Africans in the Congo (28,455 out of 94,531 in 1955) lived in the Katanga. In contrast, the Katanga African population of one and one-half million is the smallest of any province, and its population density of 7.56 per square mile is less than half the average throughout the country. Thus while the ratio of Europeans to Africans throughout the Congo was only 1 in 140, in the Katanga it was 1 in 50. Economically the Congo can not hope to become a viable nation without the Katanga, whose President, Moïse Tshombe, declared it an independent state and has been reluctant to join any confederation of provinces unless the Katanga controls the revenues and hence the political power. This paper will attempt to analyze political developments in the Katanga immediately before and after Independence (June 30, 1960) in terms of the ethnographic background, and on this basis to predict some likely future developments.

The Katanga was first entered by Lacerda in 1798, and traversed by the Portuguese *pombeiros* in 1806–10 and by David Livingstone in 1853; but it remained virtually unknown until the 1890's when the geologists Cornet and Diederich discovered its tremendous mineral resources. Before this time, the meager game and unproductive soil had attracted only a sparse and scattered population, whose complicated migration patterns are fairly well known through traditional

NOTE: This paper is based on field research carried on between January and November, 1960, in the Congo and adjacent areas on a Foreign Area Training Fellowship from the Ford Foundation, and in cooperation with the *Centre Interfacultaire d'Anthropologie et de Linguistique Africaine* of the *Université Officielle du Congo Belge et du Ruanda-Urundi* under the direction of Dr. Jacques J. Maquet.

¹ J. Maes and O. Boone, *Les Peuplades du Congo Belge*, Musée du Congo Belge, Publications du Bureau de Documentation Ethnographique, Series 2, Monographies Ideologiques, I (Bruxelles, 1935); George Peter Murdock, *Africa, Its Peoples and Their Culture History* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), pp. 284–305.

² Melville J. Herskovits, "Belgian Congo: Peoples and Culture," in *Belgium*, ed. Jan-Albert Goris (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1945), p. 353.

³ Guy Malengreau, "Recent Developments in Belgian Africa," in *Africa Today*, ed. C. Grove Haines (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), pp. 337–40.

histories.⁴ The Congo-Zambezi watershed and the Kasai and Luapula Rivers which form the boundaries with Angola and Northern Rhodesia were never effective barriers, and every important Katanga tribe lives on both sides of these frontiers.

The Katangais may be grouped into two tribal complexes, the Lunda and the Luba. The Empire of the Mwata Yamvo of Lunda stretches from the Kwango District of Leopoldville Province through southern Kasai and western Katanga and the contiguous areas of northeastern Angola (Lunda and Moxico Provinces) into the Balovale District of Northern Rhodesia. Far to the east in the Luapula Valley, an autonomous Lunda aristocracy under the Mwata Kazembe dominates the Bemba, Lamba, and other related tribes around the Pedicule. These are separated from their ancestral empire by the territory of the Luba and related tribes which stretches from Northern Rhodesia through central and northern Katanga into the Kasai.

Each of these peoples claims complete political control over all territory it held at the time of the Belgian occupation. Although virtually no Katanga tribe can make a case for its people being the original inhabitants of its present area, the idea of unalienable tribal land based on first occupancy is supported by religious sanctions.⁵

URBANIZATION AND TRIBAL AFFILIATION

In the 60 years of Belgian control, the migrations which have long been a feature of Katanga life greatly increased in response to the better economic and social opportunities in the mining towns, along the railroads, and at the missions and crossroads which became trading centers. Over 20 per cent of the Congolese (32 per cent of the taxpayers) now live outside their *chefferie* of birth.⁶

The 200,000 residents of Elisabethville are almost entirely non-local, representing 52 African tribes and 30 non-African nations. Roughly half of the Africans are Luba from mineral-poor northern Katanga, or the so-called Luba-Kasai who followed the railroad into the Kasai during the last two generations and are now culturally and politically distinct from their northern Katanga cousins. There are also sizable communities of Chokwes from Angola, Bembas and Lambas from Rhodesia, Lulua and Songye from the Kasai, and other tribes such as the Rwanda even farther from their homelands. The same immigrant populations inhabit Jadotville, Kolwezi, Kisenge, and other Katanga towns. But unlike similar urban centers in South Africa and elsewhere, Katanga urbanization does not seem to produce extensive detribalization.⁷ Although tribes are mixed together indiscriminately at work and in housing, tribal affiliation remains the most important factor in social life, marriage, and political orientation. People frequently

⁴ Leon Duysters, "Histoire des Aluunda," *Problèmes d'Afrique Centrale*, 40, 2me Trimestre (1958).

⁵ I. G. Cunnison, *The Luapula Peoples of Northern Rhodesia* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959), p. 54.

⁶ Malengreau, *loc. cit.*, p. 343; Fernand Bezy, *Problèmes Structurels de l'Economie Congolaise*, Publications de l'Université Lovanium de Leopoldville (Louvain, 1957), p. 29.

⁷ Cf. J. Comhaire, "Some Aspects of Urbanization in the Belgian Congo," *American Journal of Sociology*, 42 (July 1956), 11-13; Jacques Denis, S.J., *Le Phénomène Urban en Afrique Centrale* (Namur, 1958), pp. 118, 141-52, Carte 23.

return to their villages to display, distribute, and enjoy their wealth, to be replaced by new arrivals from the bush who are welcomed and given temporary housing by their town relatives. To a certain extent, removal to town intensifies family and tribal loyalties, because rights and duties that are taken for granted in a bush village become crucially important in town. As a result, when the opportunity for political organization came to the Congo in 1958–59, it took place on essentially tribal lines which reflect these cultural realities.

All of the approximately 25 tribes in the Katanga feel themselves to be related, “sons of the same mother,” and some of their kinship structures and associations cut across tribal lines. Their languages, although not mutually comprehensible, are relatively easily learned, but this is rarely necessary because Kishwahili functions as a lingua franca as, more recently, does French. According to tradition, the Lunda Empire changed from matriliney to patriliney when the Empress Lueji married Chibunda Ilunga, a patrilineal Luba, in the seventeenth century, causing her disgusted brothers to migrate and found new tribes.⁸ Most of these have remained matrilineal, although in recent years the Belgians have encouraged chiefs to nominate a son rather than a nephew as successor.

Although tribal endogamy is the approved behavior, intertribal mating has evidently always been common. Even in Dilolo Territory far removed from the cities, tribal affiliation has become so complex through intermarriages of Lunda, Ndembu, Chokwe, Minungu, and Luena that the Belgian administration ceased to record it in the census. A leading Chokwe politician is known to be half Lunda, and his wife in Minungu. The Mwata Yamvo of Lunda is the son of a Chokwe mother, and Samutoma, Grand Chef of the Chokwe, is part Lunda. There are also cases of individuals and groups who have changed their tribal affiliation. A Chokwe village in Kapanga Territory decided to “turn Lunda” and adopted the Lunda language in order not to be expelled from this predominantly Lunda region.⁹ More commonly Ndembu, Luena, and Minungu describe themselves as Chokwe in the Dilolo Territory where the Chokwe are in numerical and cultural ascendancy. Much to the amusement of the Chokwe, Kete and Sala-Mpasu try to cloak their cannibal ancestry by calling themselves Chokwe in Dilolo, although in Elisabethville they try to be taken for Lunda. The royal Lunda chiefs sent from the Mwata Yamvo’s court at Musumba and their leading Ndembu subjects tend to resist “Chokweization,” but in at least one case, a Ndembu-Lunda chief, married to a Chokwe and ruling a largely Chokwe *chef-ferie* joined the Chokwe political party in the name of expediency.

One of the standard questions in kinship studies concerns the tribal affiliation of a child whose parents come from a matrilineal and a patrilineal tribe respectively. In the Katanga, the child of a Lunda father and a Chokwe mother would technically have his choice, since both the mother’s and the father’s tribes would claim him. But in the opposite case, he would technically be tribeless. In a conflict situation, the maternal side wins in both cases, since among both Lunda and Chokwe clan affiliation which is inherited through the mother usually

⁸ Duysters, *op cit.*, pp. 8–9.

⁹ The Reverend D. Corbett, personal communication, April 14, 1960.

takes precedence. In effect no Congolese considers himself or another as being tribeless, but his affiliation does not always reflect the biological and historical facts. A few urban *evolués* have called for an end to tribalism¹⁰ and the development of a Congolese national sentiment; but for the vast majority of Congolese, primary loyalty still rests in the family, and the tribe is the largest unit of organization recognized.

POLITICAL PARTIES

Congolese political parties developed from tribal "cultural associations" in the cities under the direction of the lower level of *evolués*, who saw in them opportunities for upward mobility. The better educated and higher placed *evolués* were resented by these leaders, and soon each party was dominated by one or more strong personalities in the Latin-American tradition of *personalismo*. These organizations were political parties in name only, with vague or self-contradictory platforms, shifting personnel, and frequent changes in affiliation.¹¹ Since the very concept of a nation is unfamiliar to most Congolese, all political issues were essentially local, even the primary issue of the basic form of the national government. Thus Lumumba's insistence on a unitary government derived in part at least from his desire to ensure that his tribe, the impoverished Tetela of the Kasai, would share in the Katanga's wealth.

The most vital issues concerned the ownership and administration of tribal lands, especially those which had become urban centers with migrant populations. For instance, the Sanga, original inhabitants of the Lubumbashi area where Elisabethville was built, with some justification demanded control of all administrative offices such as burgomaster of each *cit  indig ne* or *centre extracoutumier*, on the grounds that the immigrant tribes were living there on Sanga suffrage, and should be willing to acknowledge Sanga suzerainty. The immigrant tribes, infinitely more numerous, prosperous, and Europeanized than the Sanga, preferred municipal administration and the appointing of chiefs to be controlled by representatives of the inhabitants.

The same situation exists in other major Congo cities, and in rural *chefferies* with immigrant populations. Representing the Kongo autochthones of Leopoldville, Joseph Kasavubu early in his career established his reputation by proclaiming *le droit du premier occupant* to justify his demand that the Bangala, who make up half of Leopoldville's population, be repatriated to their ancestral bush upriver.¹² In Luluabourg, the demand of the Bena Lulua that their Luba-Kasai "slaves" either recognize Lulua chiefs or return to Katanga has produced one of the bloodiest genocide campaigns in African history. There is similar trouble between Congolese and Rwandais for the control of Usumbura. In each of these cases, possibly as the result of selective migration, the migrant peoples are better educated and more Europeanized than their conservative hosts, and hence hold most of the best jobs. Bank employees, postal clerks, mission clergy, schoolteach-

¹⁰ Ruth Slade, *The Belgian Congo, Some Recent Changes*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 26.

¹¹ Alan P. Merriam, *Congo: Background of Conflict*, (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1961), pp. 114ff.

¹² Paul Van Reyn, *Le Congo Politique; Les Parties et les Elections* (Bruxelles, 1960), p. 20.

ers, railway employees, mine foremen, and small businessmen most often come from these "upstart" tribes. They are willing to speak Kiswahili or French, become at least nominally Christian, wear European clothes, and give up such customs as facial scarification which Europeans have regarded as "retrograde." They come close to being the *petit-bourgeoisie* the Belgians had hoped to develop in the Congo, and tend to be conservative in dress and manner, to save their money, build neat little homes, and buy secondhand cars. They are a unique class in Central Africa, and noticeably more affluent than all but a handful of Africans in surrounding countries. Because of closer contact and economic competition, they are often bitterly anti-white, and the Luba in particular blame the whites for having sided with their "less-evolved" Lulua overlords.¹³ At the same time, there are never enough jobs for these people except in low-prestige subsistence agriculture. A well-paid job is so desirable that some 46 per cent of the African staff of *Union Minière* have been employed there for over ten years. These people differ from an elite in their lack of secondary education; and they only incidentally come from the ranks of the indigenous aristocracy whose children were never given special opportunities by Belgian policy. The necessity of an elite for establishing the administration of a post-colonial country has often been noted, but the Belgians retort that a "native oligarchy" is merely another form of domination.

THE ELECTIONS OF MAY 1960

In the elections immediately preceding Independence, 113 political parties put up candidates, but only the MNC (*Mouvement National Congolais*) of Lumumba made any pretense of being a nationwide political organization running candidates in five of the six provinces. In the Katanga, only two political organizations ran candidates, but both of these contained a number of lesser tribal groups.

CONAKAT (*Confédération des Associations du Katanga*) had originally attempted to unite all Katanga tribes in one province-wide party, but soon lost the support of the Luba-Katanga party, BALUBAKAT, because the policy of *premier occupant* threatened the large Luba colony in Elisabethville. Besides two insignificant European parties, CONAKAT includes:

- (1) The Western Lunda under the Mwata Yamvo. Moise Tshombe, head of CONAKAT, is married to the daughter of the Mwata Yamvo, and is himself a prominent Lunda businessman.
- (2) The Ndembu or southern Lunda, and the Minungu, culturally distinct tribes related to the Lunda.
- (3) The Kete and Sala-Mpasu, cannibal tribes from the Kasai border who have often served as mercenaries for the Lunda Empire.
- (4) The Eastern Lunda under the Mwata Kazembe on the Congolese west bank of the Luapula River.

¹³ Jules Chome, *Le Drame de Luluabourg* (Bruxelles, 1960), pp. 23ff.

(5) The Congolese Bemba, Aushi, Shila, and Tabwa, related tribes ruled by the Mwata Kazembe.¹⁴

(6) The Lamba of the Pedicule, with Lamba-speaking groups such as the Lala and the Seba (Sewa).¹⁵ Tshombe once justified his acceptance of political funds from *Union Minière* on the grounds that they would be used "to free our brothers, the Lamba and Bemba," presumably from the yoke of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland where the majority of them live. The desirability of uniting the Katanga and Rhodesian Copperbelts into an economically and politically powerful nation was a dream of Belgian industrialists, and has been frequently espoused by Sir Roy Welensky, Prime Minister of the Federation.

(7) The Yeke, descendants of Nyamwezi warriors from the Tabora District of Tanganyika who under their leader, M'Siri, conquered the central Katanga in the mid-nineteenth century and intermarried with their Luba subjects.

(8) The Sanga and the Kaonde who, although of Luba origin, defend the *premier occupant* doctrine because they are autochthones of Elisabethville.

(9) The *Lulua Frères*, political organization of the Bena Lulua of the Kasai, who were evidently willing to jeopardize their residence in Katanga urban centers if the *premier occupant* theory would serve to expel the Luba-Kasai from Lulua-bourg.

The opponents of CONAKAT policies formed themselves into a CARTEL which included:

(1) BALUBAKAT (*Association des Baluba du Katanga*), the party of Kiluba-speaking "true" Luba of Katanga, led by Jason Sendwe, and including such sub-Luba groups as the Bahemba and the Bena Mitumba.

(2) FEDEKA (*Federation des Associations Tribales des Originaires du Kasai*), made up of Kasai peoples who have settled in the Katanga, dominated by the Chiluba- or Kituba-speaking so-called Luba-Kasai of the Luluabourg area, but also including such related immigrant groups as the Songye, the Kusu, and the Tetela (Lumumba's tribe), living in the Katanga.¹⁶

(3) ATCAR (*Association Tshokwe du Congo, Angola, et Rhodesie*), the Chokwe party which also includes most Luena (Luvale). Both groups originate in Angola, but have been resident in the Congo long enough to have some *chefs-feries* of their own in western Lunda country around Dilolo.

The CARTEL espoused the right of migrants to remain in cities outside their tribal areas, municipal as against tribal administration of towns, and the election of chiefs by all residents of a *chefferie*. On the problem of the form the national government should take, Sendwe has stated, ". . . we wish a united

¹⁴ Cunnison, *op. cit.*, p. 37; Edmond Verhulpen, *Baluba et Balubaïses du Katanga* (Anvers, 1936), p. 384; Georges van der Kerken, *Les Sociétés Bantoues du Congo Belge et les Problèmes de la Politique Indigène* (Bruxelles, n.d.), p. 26.

¹⁵ C. M. Doke, *The Lambas of Northern Rhodesia* (London: Harrap, 1931), p. 17.

¹⁶ Verhulpen, *op. cit.*, p. 26; Chome, *op. cit.*, p. 10; M. W. Hilton-Simpson, *Land and Peoples of the Kasai* (London, 1911), p. 72.

Congo with a central government, composed of six federated provinces each of which has a large degree of autonomy."¹⁷

At the time of the elections, the CARTEL joined with the MNC-Kalonji. This is the "intellectual" wing which broke away from the "extremist" Lumumba MNC party in a battle for power, and which is in effect the party of the Luba-Kasai who in the Katanga make up FEDEKA. Hence the Mutetela Lumumba and his enemy, the Luba-Kasai Kalonji (actually a mulatto), were tribally related, but this did not stop Lumumba from sending his troops to join the Lulua in their campaign to exterminate the Luba of Luluabourg. Cyrille Adoula, present premier of the Leopoldville central government, is a Luba-Kasai.

In the national elections, Lumumba's MNC won a weak victory by taking 38 of the 69 seats necessary for a majority of the 137 seats in the *Chambre des Députés*. Thus by gathering the dissidents of the other provinces, plus his strongly anti-white following from Stanleyville, Lumumba was able to form the first government; but his extremely shaky position may well have contributed to his unstable and erratic behavior in office.¹⁸

In the Katanga, although the Luba and their immigrant friends outnumber the Lunda, CONAKAT was victorious in the elections by a small majority. The *Cartelistes* immediately charged the Belgian administration with stuffing the ballot boxes, and echoed Lumumba's accusation that the Belgians were planning to set up a puppet African government subservient to Belgian economic interests. There is no question but that *Union Minière* supported CONAKAT munificently, and Tshombe in return frequently espoused "a Belgo-Congolese community."

After its defeat, the CARTEL changed its affiliation from Kalonji to Lumumba as champion against the Lunda, following the ancient adage about joining the winning side. It is difficult to see how the Luba-Katanga could favor a united Congo supported by Katanga wealth, but of course the local issues took precedence over distant national problems. Suffice it to say that the so-called *Lumumbiste* forces which captured Manono and killed the Irish UN troops in February 1961 were actually young BALUBAKATS who may or may not have heard of Lumumba at that time. This same group, now nominally following Gizenga as Lumumba's successor, killed the Italian UN troops at Kindu in November 1961, and at other times have stood off Tshombe's forces.

When the MNC-Lumumba won the provincial government of the Kasai, Kalonji set up his own *Etat Minier Independent du Kasai*, with himself as "King" and his capital at Bakwanga near the Katanga border. Thus as a separatist, he found himself fighting the same battles as his erstwhile enemy Tshombe. They quickly united to form a solid front, so that the Luba-Kasai found themselves on opposite sides from the Luba-Katanga and the FEDEKA Luba-Kasai resident in the Katanga. But unlike Tshombe, Kalonji kept in the good graces of Kasavubu by his willingness to "cooperate," and later joined the new Central Government of his fellow-tribesman, Adoula. In his analysis of Congolese national politics,

¹⁷ "Les Problèmes du Katanga," *Courrier Africain* (CRISP), 5 (March 4, 1960), 6; quoted by Merriam, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

¹⁸ Merriam, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

Merriam classes Kalonji's MNC with Kasavubu's ABAKO (*Alliance des Bakongo*) as Separatist-Federalist parties, and CONAKAT and BALUBAKAT as Federalist parties.¹⁹

Since there had always been dissension among the Luba-Katanga, with the conservative chiefs favoring the aristocratic Tshombe over Sendwe and his urban anti-traditionalists, Tshombe offered places in his government to the *Cartelistes*. They refused, and boycotted the *Assemblée Provinciale* on the basis of the alleged election irregularities. Kasongo, the Grand Chef of the Luba-Katanga, was assassinated when he indicated his willingness to cooperate with the Tshombe government. Although Tshombe has frequently proclaimed that the Katanga belongs to all her present inhabitants, he has never specified how all might be fairly represented in government. Sendwe has declared Northern Katanga as the new "Luapula State of the Balubas," and his being seated at the Coquilhatville Conference was the immediate cause of Tshombe's walkout which ended in his arrest. Although it was thought that the "Luba war" might be stopped by Tshombe's taking Sendwe into his government, Tshombe instead has forced as many Luba as possible to leave Elisabethville or face detention in concentration camps which until recently contained an estimated 30,000 people.

Political affiliations do not always correspond with tribal or class lines. The Grand Chef Samutoma of the Chokwe changed his affiliation from ATCAR to CONAKAT a few days before the elections, taking three other Chokwe chiefs with him; but as far as ATCAR partisans are concerned, he gave up any claim to Chokwe leadership. Even before the elections, there existed in Elisabethville such organizations as ATKAT (*Association des Tshokwe du Katanga*) and BALUBAKAT-pro-CONAKAT made up of urban people who hoped this display of loyalty would exempt them from repatriation.

The Chokwe, with their idea of a Chokweland Irredenta implicit in the title of ATCAR, were planning to claim the so-called Luacano Triangle, a valueless stretch of Angola between the Kasai and Luao Rivers which had been traded by the Belgians for an area in Bas-Congo needed for the Matadi-Leopoldville Railroad. But in July 1960, Tshombe sent to Dilolo Territory a new African administrator to replace the Belgian administrator, Theate. He proved to be François Muteba, son of the Minungu chief of Mumé, one of the three villages which constitute Dilolo Gare. Although Muteba's mother was a Chokwe, as a member of CONAKAT he was unacceptable to the local Chokwe, especially when it was rumored that he intended to meet with the Portuguese administrator in the nearby Angola frontier post of Teixeira da Sousa to discuss the immediate repatriation of 50,000 Chokwe to their ancestral desert. When understandably, 2000 Chokwe rioted around the Territorial Offices and stoned the CONAKAT flag which had replaced the blue-and-gold Congo flag hoisted only a few weeks previously, Theate strongly recommended that Muteba return to Elisabethville and request replacement by an administrator from some non-local tribe. In a few days Muteba returned with full authority from Tshombe, threatened with arrest the Belgian civil servants for possessing the weapons they had been issued for his

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

protection, declared ATCAR illegal, and forcibly repatriated a Kasai woman who ran a bar popular with Chokwe. Tensions mounted when the handful of remaining Belgian troops were pulled out and Belgian women were ordered to leave the interior. As the drums beat nightly, there were stories of "a fete that is not a fete," where the Chokwe performed the magic rites that would make them invulnerable to bullets. An evil omen was the news that a certain chief had sent his wives into Angola for safety. Finally the "war" broke out, when someone put a torch to someone else's house. In the ensuing three days, August 5-7, 1960, 80 per cent of the African homes in and around Dilolo Gare (population 10,000) were burned, and an estimated 43 people (officially 7) were killed. Tshombe placated the Chokwe by replacing Muteba with M. Sovange, a Belgian with a martinet reputation earned as director of Colagrel, a prison farm at nearby Kasaji for anti-white Kimbangiste religious cultists from Leopoldville. An uneasy peace returned to Dilolo Territory, and the Portuguese, Greek, and Belgian traders remained with their families, at least for a time, though most of the Belgian civil servants returned to Europe. The Belgian nursing nuns continue to operate the hospital and out-patient clinic, and the Flemish Catholic, British Protestant, and Government schools have all been expanded.

Tshombe ruled the Katanga with unexpected efficiency. All civil service positions had been Africanized by November 1960, with Belgian *conseillers* sometimes being retained during the period of transition. After the disorders following the mutiny of the *Force Publique* in July 1960, an estimated half of the European population left the Katanga, but perhaps 15,000 remained or returned to take advantage of the high wages offered by Tshombe to civil servants and officers in the new *Gendarmerie* which replaced the *Force Publique*. In one case, the Belgian principal of an *Ecole Officiel* was paid double his salary to remain as councilor to the School Superintendent of a Katanga District. A fifty-year-old Belgian trader was paid \$500 a month to become an officer in the *Gendarmerie*. Since Europeans may now hold Katangais citizenship, the UN may find it difficult to expel these "foreign mercenaries and advisors" solely on the basis of race.

The secret of Tshombe's administrative success was the enormous revenues he received from *Union Minière*, who recognized him and not the Central Government as the legal government of the Katanga. As a result, the Katangais francs are readily convertible into foreign currencies at roughly one and one-half times as much as Congo Central Government francs. In spite of all that has been said about their lack of experience, the Katangais in government offices, banks, and customs houses seem reasonably efficient and affable.

There is no pretense that this government was anything but a dictatorship, which recently had begun to develop such trappings as mounted guards in comic-opera costumes and shining helmets. The CARTEL parties were banned, and no meetings were allowed. An assistant administrator who returned from leave in Belgium soon after Independence was immediately expelled for alleged pro-Chokwe sympathies. Even while Tshombe was under arrest, the government continued smoothly under an aristocratic quadrumvirate led by Godefroid

Munongo, grandson of the Yeke warrior M'Siri, and himself both vice-president of CONAKAT and Interior Minister in Tshombe's government.²⁰

At this writing, Tshombe has left for Europe with a stopover in Angola, where the remnants of his army are said to have fled. With UN troops in control of Elisabethville and the mines, and Ileo as Adoula's resident minister in Katanga, Tshombe's political future is uncertain, in spite of his "legal" claim to rule. He has powerful enemies:

(a) The increasingly important Pan-African powers, for whom the continued presence of Belgians is a threat to national and continental goals and a challenge which calls for the most astute political maneuvering on an international scale.

(b) The United Nations, and in particular the "Neutral Bloc," who espouse a unitary Congo so that rich Katanga would share its wealth with its poor neighboring provinces. It should be noted that both Belgium and the United States have also consistently advocated similar solutions. No nation, not even Belgium, recognized the State of Katanga.

(c) The Central Government led by Adoula and Kasavubu, for whom Katanga revenues are a *sine qua non* for any viable future government, whether unitary or federal. Even so, the Central Government's share in these revenues could only make up an estimated 10 per cent of its current monthly deficit.

(d) Jason Sendwe and the BALUBAKAT, exiles in their own homeland.

(e) CONAKAT officials who might gain by Tshombe's eclipse, such as Godefroid Munongo who is rumored to be the "real power" in Katanga, using Tshombe as an expendable figurehead.

(f) Although most of the former French African countries tacitly supported Tshombe's position, the influential Abbe Youlou of the Brazzaville Congo Government could be influenced by his fellow Kongo, Kasavubu, to shift this support to the Central Government, especially since it has made peace with the UN forces.

Predictions:

1. The Tananarive Conference in March 1961 agreed on a loose Confederation of independent states based roughly on tribal groupings, and seventeen such divisions have now replaced the original provincial governments except in the Katanga. This type of government, although distasteful to nationalists, reflects Congolese ethnographic and political realities, but possibly requires a stronger "strongman" than Adoula to hold it together.

2. The army or *Gendarmerie* will become the elite so badly needed in the Congo. Some foreign officers, even Belgians, may remain for some time.

3. Europeans will continue to live in the Katanga, where they have always been "birds of passage" more than *colons*. The following groups are particularly needed:

²⁰ Smith Hempstone, "Tshombe's Successor Holds Fort," *Chicago Daily News*, June 8, 1961, p. 2.

(a) Professionals, especially doctors, nurses, and schoolteachers (including missionaries), who run governmental and government-aided institutions providing for the health and education desired by all Congolese. Very little resentment toward these individuals exists in the Katanga.

(b) Belgian civil servants now working as councilors and administrators, to be replaced fairly soon by local elite as they complete their education. The superior objectivity of outsiders in judging local legal cases is often verbalized by rural Congolese.

(c) Big Business, both the directorial level of *Union Minière*, *Forminière*, and other large companies, and the upper levels of technicians and engineers, until the mines are nationalized when they can be successfully staffed by Congolese. A leftist coup in the Central Government could cause nationalization to occur before the necessary staff is available, in which case East Europeans might be brought in as at Suez.

(d) Small merchants, many of them Greek, Italian, Portuguese, or other non-Belgian nationals, who provide distributive services in a society with few traditions of business. This group is often hated (six Greeks were hanged in their burning shops during the mutiny in Elisabethville), but few Africans are willing to replace them, or to do without their services.

4. A successful crash-program in education will be instituted. Already the *Universite Officielle* has been converted into a "degree mill" for doctors, lawyers, teachers, and technicians, with a primarily European staff. Research activities and African studies have been eliminated. By law all teaching from primary school upward must now be in French rather than in the local languages encouraged by the Belgians. "There are no books about rockets in Chichokwe." Until more locals are trained, teachers will be recruited abroad in French-speaking countries.

5. There will be continued border trouble among the various provinces, and between the Congo and her neighbors, as the tribes seek more complete correlation of people and political unit.

6. The ancient enmity between rural and urban dwellers will continue to grow, and perhaps cut across tribal lines as conservative and local-minded farmers resist the supratribal nationalism and socialism of the cities.

7. No Western-type democracy will emerge, but rather a one-party government based on tribe. Since a wide range of opinion will be represented on the Executive Committee of such a party, agreement will be achieved by the threat of expulsion from the party.

8. Whether in a Confederation or as an independent nation, the Katanga offers a more satisfactory future to its inhabitants than almost any other African country.